Abstract

A "one-time program" for a channel C is a hypothetical cryptographic primitive by which a user may evaluate C on only one input state of her choice.  (Think Mission Impossible: "this tape will self-destruct in five seconds.")  One-time programs cannot be achieved without extra assumptions such as secure hardware; it is known that one-time programs can be constructed for classical channels using a very basic hypothetical hardware device called a "one-time memory".   Our main result is the construction of a one-time program for any quantum channel specified by a circuit, assuming the same basic one-time memory devices used for classical channels.  The construction achieves universal composability -- the strongest possible security -- against any quantum adversary.  It employs a technique for computation on authenticated quantum data and we present a new authentication scheme called the "trap" scheme for this purpose.   Finally, we observe that there is a pathological class of channels that admit trivial one-time programs without any hardware assumptions whatsoever.  We characterize these channels, assuming an interesting conjecture on the invertible (or decoherence-free) subspaces of an arbitrary channel.   Joint work with Anne Broadbent and Douglas Stebila. http://arxiv.org/abs/1211.1080

Details

Talk Number PIRSA:12120028
Speaker Profile Gus Gutowski
Collection Quantum Information