Quantum Foundations

The talk first offers a brief assessment of the realist and nonrealist understanding of quantum theory, in relation to the role of probability and statistics there from the perspective of quantum information theory, in part in view of several recent developments in quantum information theory in the work of M. G. D’Ariano and L. Hardy, among others. It then argues that what defines quantum theory, both quantum mechanics and quantum field theory, most essentially, including as concerns realism or the lack thereof and the probability and statistics, is a new (vs. classical physics or relativity) role of technology in quantum physics. This role was first considered by Bohr in his analysis of the fundamental role of measuring instruments in the constitution of quantum phenomena, which, he argued, is responsible for the difficulties of providing a realist description of quantum objects and their behavior, and, correlatively, for the irreducibly probabilistic or statistical nature of all quantum predictions. In this paper, I mean “technology” in a broader sense, akin to what the ancient Greeks called “tekhne” (“technique”). It refers the means by which we create new mental and material constructions, such as mathematical, scientific, or philosophical theories or works of art and architecture, or machines, and through which we interact with the world. I shall consider three forms of technology—mathematical, experimental, and digital. The relationships among them were crucial to the discovery of the Higgs boson, and, I argue, are likely to remain equally crucial, indeed unavoidable, in the future of physics, especially quantum physics.

The Reeh-Schlieder theorem says, roughly, that, in any reasonable quantum field theory,  for any bounded region of spacetime R, any state can be approximated arbitrarily closely by operating on the vacuum state (or any state of bounded energy) with operators formed by smearing polynomials in the field operators with functions having support in R.  This strikes many as counterintuitive, and Reinhard Werner has glossed the theorem as saying that “By acting on the vacuum with suitable operations in a terrestrial laboratory, an experimenter can create the Taj Mahal on (or even behind) the Moon!” This talk has two parts.  First, I hope to convince listeners that the theorem is not counterintuitive,  and that it follows immediately from facts that are already familiar fare to anyone who has digested the opening chapters of any standard introductory textbook of QFT.  In the second, I will discuss what we can learn from the theorem about how relativistic causality is implemented in quantum field theories.

In this talk we will discuss how C*-algebras can be identified and characterised in terms of certain cosheaves with self-action. The reason we are interested in such a study is it to try and give a rigorous mathematical derivation of the axioms of quantum theory. In particular, many of the standard axioms for C*-algebras have unclear physical and operational meaning, but by defining an equivalence of categories between C*-algebras and cosheaves with self-action, we believe that these axioms can acquire a clear operational meaning. So far, however, we have only managed to show that every C*-algebra becomes a cosheaf with self-action, but we don't know whether the converse holds as well. This work is done in collaboration with Tobias Fritz.

The existence of observables that are incompatible or not jointly measurable is a characteristic feature of quantum mechanics, which is the root of a number of nonclassical phenomena, such as uncertainty relations, wave--particle dual behavior, Bell-inequality violation, and contextuality.

However,  no intuitive  criterion  is available for determining  the compatibility of even two (generalized) observables, despite the overarching importance of this problem  and intensive efforts of many researchers over more than 80 years.

Here we introduce an information theoretic  paradigm together with an intuitive geometric picture for decoding incompatible observables,

starting from two simple ideas:   Every  observable can only provide

limited  information and   information is monotonic  under data

processing. By virtue of quantum estimation theory, we introduce a family of universal criteria for detecting incompatible observables and a natural measure of incompatibility, which are applicable to arbitrary number of arbitrary observables. Based on this framework, we derive a family of universal  measurement uncertainty relations, provide a simple information theoretic explanation of quantitative wave--particle duality, and offer new perspectives for understanding Bell nonlocality, contextuality, and quantum precision limit.

In this talk, I will explore a timeless interpretation of quantum mechanics of closed systems, solely in terms of path integrals in non-relativistic timeless configuration space. What prompts a fresh look at the foundational problems in this context, is the advent of multiple gravitational models in which Lorentz symmetry is only emergent. In this setting, I propose a new understanding of records as certain relations between two configurations, the recorded one and the record-holding one. These relations are formalized through  a factorization of the amplitude kernel, which forbids unwanted 'recoherence' of branches. On this basis, I show that in simple cases the Born rule is consistent with counting the relative density of observers with the same records. Furthermore, unlike what occurs in consistent histories,  in this context there is indeed a preferred notion of coarse-grainings: those centered around piece-wise classical paths in configuration space (with a certain radius).  Thus, this new understanding  claims to resolve aspects of the measurement problem which are still deemed controversial in the standard approaches (but which probably leaves others open...).

In this talk we will discuss the relation between the incompatibility of quantum measurements and quantum nonlocality. We show that any set of measurements that is not jointly measurable (i.e. incompatible) can be used for demonstrating EPR steering, a form of quantum nonlocality. This implies that EPR steering and (non) joint measurability can be viewed as equivalent. Moreover, we discuss the connection between Bell nonlocality and joint measurability, and give evidence that both notions are inequivalent. This suggest the existence of incompatible quantum measurements which are Bell local, similarly to certain entangled states which admit a local hidden variable model. Finally, we discuss applications of these results to problems in joint mesurability, and for EPR steering using randomly chosen measurements.

To best distinguish between classical and non-classical models of nature requires a good notion of classicality. I will argue that noncontextuality is a good candidate for this notion. Until now, certain theoretical and experimental roadblocks have stood in the way of a test of noncontextuality which is free of unattainable experimental idealizations. I will present solutions to these roadblocks as well as the results of an experimental test.

One necessity to avoid the measurement problem in quantum mechanics is a clear ontology. Such an ontology is for instance provided by Bohmian mechanics. In the non-relativistic regime, Bohmian mechanics is a theory about particles whose motion is governed by a velocity field. The latter is generated by a wave

function solving the Schrödinger equation. In view of Feynman's criticism towards classical field theory one may wonder whether such a complex object as the wave function is needed to account for quantum phenomena. After all the value of the velocity field, i.e., of the wave function, is only needed in the vicinity of the configuration of the particle positions, however, it is defined everywhere in configuration space, even in places where the configuration might never roam.  In a joint work with M. Hall and H. Wiseman we were able to formulate an approach to quantum mechanics that is capable to describe typical quantum phenomena like interference without a wave function, having only particles.  This approach comes at the cost of introducing many classical worlds, hence the name Many-Interacting-Worlds approach (MIW). In MIW the force on each particle is given by 1) Newton's force describing the interaction within each world and 2) an additional force term describing an interaction between the worlds.  Similar approaches have been suggested by B. Poirier and C. Sebens. I will give an overview on MIW, discuss the nature of its equations of motion, and its empirical import.

Using quantum control in foundational experiments allows new theoretical and experimental possibilities. We show how, e.g.,  quantum controlling devices reverse a temporal ordering in  detection. We consider probing of wave–particle duality in   quantum-controlled and the entanglement-assisted delayed-choice experiments. Then we discuss other situations where quantum control may be useful, and finally demonstrate how the techniques we developed are applied to the study of  consistency of the classically reasonable requirements.  In a version of the delayed-choice experiment which ostensibly combines determinism, independence of hidden variables on the conducted experiments, and wave-particle objectivity we show that these ideas are incompatible with any theory, not only with quantum mechanics.

 It is well known - to those who know it - that noise and randomness can enhance signal resolution. I'll present an easy-to-follow example from digital audio that illustrates the way in which adding noise ("dither") prior to measurement enhances the accuracy with which we are able to distinguish the features of the sound or image. I will then explore the way in which the environmental interactions prior to measurement ordinarily characterized as environment-induced decoherence may play a similar role.  The paradoxical conclusion is that the quasiclassical behavior associated with such systems may be a more accurate representation of the quantum world than what we think of as fully "quantum" behavior, which may in turn be artifactual, the result of errors similar to those introduced by the discretization (also known as "quantization") of data in digital audio and imaging.

We present a formal logic modeling some aspects of the behavior of the quantum measurement process, and study some properties of the models of this logic, from which we deduce some characteristics that any such model should verify. In the case of a Hilbert space of dimension at least 3, we then show that no model can lead to the prediction with certainty of more than one atomic outcome. Moreover, if the Hilbert space is finite dimensional, we can precisely describe the structure of the predictions of any model of our logic. As a consequence, we also prove that all the models of our logic make exactly the same predictions regarding whether a given sequence of outcomes is possible.

This talk touches on three questions regarding the ontological status of quantum states using the ontological models

framework: it is assumed that a physical system has some underlying ontic state and that quantum states correspond to probability distributions over these ontic states.

The first question is whether or not quantum states are necessarily real---that is, whether or not the distributions for different quantum states must be disjoint. The PBR theorem proves the reality of quantum states by making assumptions about the ontic structure of bipartite systems, assumptions that have been challenged. Recent work has therefore concentrated on single systems, producing theorems proving the existence of pairs of quantum states whose overlap region on the ontic state space is very small.

The second question is whether the ontology of a quantum system can be macro-realist---that is, can there be "macroscopic" quantities which always have determinate values? The Leggett-Garg inequalities claim to rule out this possibility, but this conclusion has been disputed.

The third question is less familiar: Must quantum superpositions be ontic? That is, for some superposition with respect to some orthonormal basis, must ontic states exist which can be obtained by preparing the superposition, but not by preparing any of the basis states? In other words, can Schrödinger's cat always be either alive xor dead?