Quantum Foundations

The mathematical formalism of quantum theory has many features whose physical origin remains obscure. In this paper, we attempt to systematically investigate the possibility that the concept of information may play a key role in understanding some of these features. We formulate a set of assumptions, based on generalizations of experimental facts that are representative of quantum phenomena and physically comprehensible theoretical ideas and principles, and show that it is possible to deduce the finite-dimensional quantum formalism from these assumptions. The concept of information, via an information-theoretic invariance principle, plays a central role in the derivation, and gives rise to some of the central structural features of the quantum formalism.

If spacetime is "quantized" (discrete), then any equation of motion compatible with the Lorentz transformations is necessarily non-local. I will present evidence that this sort of nonlocality survives on length scales much greater than Planckian, yielding for example a nonlocal effective wave-equation for a scalar field propagating on an underlying causal set. Nonlocality of our effective field theories may thus provide a characteristic signature of quantum gravity.

In stochastic treatments of the ERRB set-up, it is equivalent to impose Bell\'s inequalities, a local causality condition, or a certain \"non-contextual hidden variables\" condition. But these conditions are violated by quantum mechanics. On the other hand, it is possible to view quantum mechanics as part of \"quantum measure theory\", a generalization of probability measure theory that allows pair wise interferences between histories whilst banning higher order interference. In this setting, is may be possible find quantum analogues of the three stochastic conditions. Following this line of inquiry, we will see that quantum measure theory allows no stronger violations of Bell\'s inequalities than does standard quantum theory. We also gain some insights into how to define causality in quantum theory.

The Everett (many-worlds) interpretation has made great progress over the past 20-30 years, largely due to the role of decoherence in providing a solution to the preferred basis problem. This makes it a serious candidate for a realist solution to the measurement problem. A remaining objection to the Everett interpretation (and one that is often considered fatal) is that that interpretation cannot make adequate sense of quantum probabilities. Dvaid Deutsch and David Wallace have argued that, by applying decision theory to the case of a rational agent who believes in the many-worlds interpretation, we can prove that such agents _act as if_ the theory predicted objective probabilities in the sense of fundamental indeterminism, or ignorance of initial conditions. I raise the issue of whether or not this, if true, is all that the many-worlds theorist needs from \'probability\'. I first suggest a reason for thinking that the answer might be \'no\': the reason is that knowing how to act on the assumption that a given theory is true is prima facie irrelevant to the question of whether we have any reason to believe the theory in the first place. I then go on to offer a solution to this problem, drawing on resources from Bayesian confirmation theory. My conclusion is that the problem of probability in the Everett interpretation has been solved.

Newton\'s first law of motion - and the very meaning of inertia - has been described as either completely obvious (D\'Alembert) or a \'logician\'s nightmare\' (ex-editor of the American Journal of Physics). Sometimes the simplest things in physics are the most subtle. The first law will be described in historical context, explaining a connection with the ancient Greeks’ distinction between natural and violent motion and with Descartes\' natural philosophy. You will also learn why it still requires careful handling and what it tells us about time in physics. \'Time and Motion\', Harvey Brown, time, motion, relative, Copernicus, Ptolemy, Galileo, Copernicanism, Descartes, inertia, Newton, standard of time, Fitzgerald, duration, inertial frame

I will discuss various different ways of quantifying the differences between two quantum observables (POVMs). Each of these approaches gives rise to a notion of approximately measuring one observable by means of measuring some other observable. This will be illustrated in the case of position and momentum by studying the question which POVMs on phase space can reasonably be said to represent a joint approximate determination of these observables. A new, universally valid trade-off relation for the associated inaccuracies will be rigorously formulated. I will sketch the proof which is an adaptation of some interesting techniques and properties of covariant phase space observables used recently by R Werner in a related project. Recommended reading (optional): quant-ph/0405184 (R Werner), quant-ph/0609185 (PB et al), and also for further background information quant-ph/0309091 (M Hall), quant-ph/0310070 (M Ozawa), quant-ph/9803051 (DM Appleby).

Quantum mechanics is a non-classical probability calculus -- but hardly the most general one imaginable. In this talk, I'll discuss some familiar non-classical properties of quantum-probabilistic models that turn out to be features of {em all} non-classical models. These include a generic no-cloning theorem obtained in recent work with Howard Barnum, Jon Barrett and Matt Leifer.